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ABSTRACT
Biometrics and soft biometrics characteristics are of great
importance in forensics applications for identifying crimi-
nals and law enforcement. Developing new biometrics and
soft biometrics are therefore of interest of many applica-
tions, among them forensics. Heartbeat signals have been
previously used as biometrics, but they have been measured
using contact-based sensors. This paper extracts heartbeat
signals, using a contact-free method by a simple webcam.
The extracted signals in this case are not as precise as those
that can be extracted using contact-based sensors. However,
the contact-free extracted heartbeat signals are shown in this
paper to have some potentials to be used as soft biometrics.
Promising experimental results on a public database, have
shown that utilizing these signals can improve the accuracy
of spoofing detection in a face recognition system.
Index Terms— Forensics, biometrics, soft biometrics,
heartbeat signals
1. INTRODUCTION
Forensic science deals with techniques used in criminal scene
investigation for collecting information and its interpretation
for the purpose of answering questions related to a crime in
a court of law [1]. Such information is usually related to the
human body or behavioral characteristics that can (or help to)
reveal the identity of criminal(s). Such characteristics are ex-
tracted either from traces that are left in the crime scene, like
DNA, handwritings, and fingerprints [2], or devices like cam-
eras and microphones, if any, that have been recording visual
and audio signals in the scene during the crime. Recorded
visual signals as well as audio signals can be of great help
as many different characteristics can be extracted from them,
characteristics that can directly be used for identification (bio-
metrics), or can help the identification process (soft biomet-
rics).
Forensics investigations have long been utilizing such hu-
man characteristics. For example, the importance of DNA
in [3], fingerprint in [4], facial images and its related soft bio-
metrics in [5], [6], gait in [7] have been discussed for forensics
applications. However, most of these biometric/soft biomet-
ric traits exhibit disadvantages in regards to accuracy, spoof-
ing and/or unobtrusiveness. For example, fingerprint can be
forged to breach the identification system, gait can be imi-
tated, and facial image can be used in absence of the person.
Thus, further investigations for new biometric traits are of in-
terest of many applications. Human heartbeat signal is one of
such emerging biometric traits.
Human heart is a muscular organ that works as a circula-
tory blood pump. When blood is pumped by the heart, some
electrical and acoustic changes occur in and around the heart
in the body, which is known as heartbeat signal [8]. Heartbeat
signal can be obtained by Electrocardiogram (ECG) using
electrical changes and Phonocardiogram (PCG) using acous-
tic changes. Both ECG and PCG heartbeat signals have al-
ready been used as biometrics for human identity verification
in the literature. A review of such important ECG-based ap-
proaches can be obtained from [9]. On the other hand, a re-
view of the important PCG-based identification methods can
be found in [10]. The common drawback of all of the above
mentioned ECG and PCG based methods for identity verifica-
tion is the requirement of using obtrusive (contact-based) sen-
sors for the acquisition of ECG or PCG signals from a subject.
In another words, for obtaining heart signals using ECG and
PCG the required sensors need to be directly installed on sub-
ject’s body, which is obviously not always possible. There-
fore, in this paper we look at contact-free measurement of the
Heartbeat Signal from Facial Videos (HSFV) and investigate
its distinctiveness potential. It is shown in this paper that such
signals have distinctive features, however, their distinctive-
ness capability are not that high to use them as biometrics.
Instead, it is shown that they can help improving the detec-
tion accuracy of a face spoofing detection algorithm in face
recognition system, and hence can be used as a soft biometric
in forensics applications, for example, with video-based face
recognition algorithms.
The proposed system obtains HSFV signals from video
sequences that are captured by a simple webcam, by tracing
changes in the color of facial images that are caused by the
heart pulses. Then, it extracts some distinctive features from
these signals. Unlike ECG and PCG based heartbeat biomet-
Fig. 1. The block diagram of the proposed system.
ric, the proposed HSFV soft biometric does not require any
obtrusive sensor such as ECG electrode or PCG microphone.
It is universal and permanent, obviously because every living
human being has an active heart. It can be more secure than
its traditional counterparts as it is difficult to be artificially
generated, and can be easily combined with state-of-the-art
face biometric without requiring any additional sensor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the pro-
posed system for detecting spoofing attacks in a face recogni-
tion system and its sub-blocks (including the heartbeat signals
measurement and feature extraction) are explained in the next
section. The experimental results are given in section 3. Fi-
nally the paper is concluded in section 4.
2. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
The block diagram of the proposed system is shown in Fig.
1. Each of these sub-blocks of the system are described in the
following subsections.
2.1. Facial video acquisition
The first step is capturing the facial video using a RGB cam-
era, which is thoroughly investigated in the literature [11,12].
As recent methods of facial video based heartbeat signal anal-
ysis utilized simple webcam for video capturing, we select a
webcam based video capturing procedure.
2.2. Face detection
Face detection is accomplished by the well-known Haar-like
features based Viola and Jones method of [13]. The face re-
gion is expressed by a rectangular bounding box in each video
frames.
2.3. Region of Interest (ROI) selection
As the face area detected by the automatic face detection
method comprises some of the surrounding areas of the face
including face boundary, it is necessary to exclude the sur-
rounding area to retain merely the area containing facial skin.
This is accomplished by obtaining a Region of Interest (ROI)
from the face by selecting 60% width of the face area detected
by the automatic face detection method.
2.4. Heartbeat signal extraction
The heartbeat signal is extracted from the facial video by trac-
ing color changes in RGB channels in the consecutive video
frames. The average of the red, green and blue components
of the whole ROI is recorded as the RGB traces of that frame.
In order to obtain a heartbeat signal from a facial video, the
statistical mean of these three RGB traces of each frame is
calculated and recoded for each frame of the video. The re-
sulting signal represents the heartbeat signal.
The heartbeat signal obtained from facial video by fol-
lowing the aforementioned approach is, however, noisy and
imprecise. This is due to the effect of external lighting, vol-
untary head-motion, induced noise by the capturing system
and the act of blood as a damper to the heart pumping pres-
sure to be transferred from the middle of the chest (where the
heart is located) to the face. Thus, we employ a denoising
filter by detecting the peak in the extracted heart signal and
discarding the out-lying RGB traces. The effect of the de-
noising operation on a noisy heartbeat signal obtained from
RGB traces is depicted in Fig. 2. The signal is then passed
through a Hodrick-Prescott filter [14] with a smoothing pa-
rameter (value = 2 in our case) in order to decompose it into
trend and cyclic components. As heartbeat is a periodic vi-
bration due to the heart pulse, we assume that the trend com-
ponent comprises the noise in the heartbeat signal induced by
voluntary head-motion. Thus, we obtain the denoised heart-
beat signal from the cyclic component.
Fig. 2. An example of heartbeat signal before (top) and after
(bottom) employing a denoising filter. On the x axis is the
frame number and on the y axis is the RGB trace.
2.5. Feature extraction
The feature extraction from the denoised HSFV is accom-
plished by employing a decomposition method called Com-
plete Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition with Adap-
tive Noise (CEEMDAN) from [15]. The CEEMDAN decom-
poses the HSFB into a small number of modes called Intrinsic
Mode Functions (IMFs). The number of IMFs can vary, but
not less than 6 in this case. Thus, we considered first 6 IMFs.
An example of first 6 IMFs for a HSFV in the case of a real
face are shown in Fig. 3. We then calculated some spectral
features of the original HSFV and each of the 6 IMFs for fea-
ture extraction. The extracted features are the statistical mean
and variance of the spectral energy, power, low-energy, grav-
ity, entropy, roll-off, flux, zero-ratio as stated in [16,17]. As a
whole, we extracted a feature vector of 112 elements for each
facial video.
Fig. 3. An example of first 6 IMFs obtained for a HSFV of
a real face. On the x and y axis are number of frames in the
video and the amplitude of the signal, respectively.
2.6. Spoofing attack detection
We employ the Support Vector Machines of [18], with a tan-
gent hyperbolic kernel function, as the classifier to discrimi-
nate between real facial video and spoofing attack.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
3.1. Experimental environment
The performance of spoofing detection using the HSFV was
evaluated in a system implemented in a combination of MAT-
LAB and C++ environment by following the methodology of
the previous section. We used the publicly available PRINT-
ATTACK database [19] for spoofing attack detection. This
database was collected by Anjos et al. and contains facial
videos (each about 10 seconds long) captured by a simple
webcam. The videos of the database are recorded in three
scenarios. These are: video of real face, video of printed face
held by operator’s hand, video of printed face held by a fixed
support. All these videos were then categorized into three
sets: train, devel, and test. The details are given in Table 1.
However, some of these videos are too dark to automatically
detect face and extract heart signal. Thus, we discarded 2
videos from the train set and 4 videos from the devel set. The
rest of the videos was used in the experiment.
Type ”train” ”devel” ”test” Total
Real face 60 60 80 200
Printed face in hand 30 30 40 100
Printed face in a support 30 30 40 100
Total 120 120 160 400
Table 1. The Numbers of videos in different groups of the
PRINT-ATTACK database [19].
3.2. Performance evaluation
A spoofing detection system exhibits two types of errors: ac-
cepting a spoofed face and rejecting a real face. First error
is measured by False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and the second
one is measured by False Rejection Rate (FRR). The perfor-
mance can be depicted on a Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics (ROC) graph where FAR and FRR are plotted against a
threshold to determine the membership in true groups of real
access and spoofed access. The ROC of the different combi-
nations of datasets, after the training using train set, are shown
in Fig. 4. From the results it is observed that the Equal Error
Rates (EER), where FAR and FRR curves intersect, are differ-
ent for different settings. When a printed face was shown in
front of the camera by holding it in a fixed place the periodic
variation in the heart signal of a real face can be discriminated
with higher accuracy as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (d). But, when
the printed face was held by hand, the hand shaking behavior
affects the result. However, the results show that HSFV can
retrieve the difference between real face and print attack mod-
erately accurately.
Fig. 4. ROC curves for employing the HSFV based spoofing detection on different combinations of the experimental datasets.
3.3. Performance comparison
We compare the performance of the HSFV with the baseline
results for the test set of the PRINT-ATTACK database pro-
vided in [19]. The results are shown in Table 2.
Type ”test”
HSFV (fixed) 66,10
HSFV (hand) 66,10
HSFV (all) 61,39
Baseline (fixed) 77,94
Baseline (hand) 85,47
Baseline (all) 82,05
HSFV (fixed)+BG 75,64
HSFV (hand)+BG 91,03
HSFV (all)+BG 85,90
Table 2. Performance of HSFV in face spoofing detection
in comparison to a baseline approach for PRINT-ATTACK
database [19].
From the results it is observed that the HSFV alone can-
not outperform the baseline approach. However, the experi-
ment reveals that the HSFV is able to unveil some clues be-
tween real face and printed face shown to a biometric sys-
tem, and can be a potential soft biometric to be used along
with other features to achieve a doable result in face spoof-
ing detection. This notion is shown in the last three rows
of Table 2, where the features extracted from HSFV is fused
with four background features (maximum, minimum, average
and standard deviation of the signal obtained from the video
frames background by following [19]), hereafter referred as
BG. We employ a score-level fusion of probability estimates
of classifier outputs obtained for HSFV and BG features. We
observe that the fusion of HSFV and BG features improves
the performance in face spoofing detection. One significant
point to mention is that when BG features were fused with
HSFV features in score-level, the spoofing detection system
showed reduced performance than the baseline as indicated
by the third-last row of Table 2. We believe that this is be-
cause of sensitivity of HSFV to the periodic noise induced by
the camera capturing system.
3.4. Discussions about HSFV as a soft biometric for
forensic investigations
Face recognition systems need to be robust against spoofing
attacks. As printed face spoofing attack is very common in
this regard, we investigate the potential of HSFV as a soft
biometric for printed face spoofing attack detection in a face
recognition system. Though from the results it is observed
that the HSFV alone cannot provide very high accuracy, the
experimental results show that the HSFV is able to unveil
some clues between real face and printed face shown to a bio-
metric system. When HSFV was fused with some other fea-
tures (BG features in our experiment), the results were consid-
erably improved in most of the cases. Thus, we can infer that
the HSFV carries some distinctive features and can be consid-
ered as a soft biometric. Hence, one could answer the ques-
tion raised by the paper by a Yes answer, i.e., heartbeat signals
extracted from facial images have some distinctive properties
and might be useful for forensics applications.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the potential of the heartbeat signal
from facial video as a new soft biometric. To do that, the dis-
tinctive properties that are carried in a heartbeat signal have
been utilized to improve the accuracy of spoofing attack de-
tection in a face recognition system. A description of the pro-
cedure of heartbeat signal extraction from facial video was
provided and experimental results were generated by using
a publicly available database for printed face spoofing attack
detection in a face recognition system. The experimental re-
sults revealed that the contact-free measured heartbeat signal
has the potential to be used as a soft biometric.
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